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Securities regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing and providing
remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. Texas has two major statutes
to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act (TSA) and the Texas Stock
Fraud Act (TSFA). 1 Since the legislature modeled the fraud provisions of the
TSA on the federal statutes, 2 Texas courts use federal court decisions
interpreting the federal statutes to interpret the TSA’s similar language. 3 This
Article, therefore, includes the Fifth Circuit cases involving state law and
securities fraud under federal law. The author does not intend for this Article to
exhaust all aspects of securities regulation but rather to update the Texas-based
securities practitioner on new developments of interest.
I.

I. COVERAGE OF THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACTS
The statutory definitions, especially those relating to what constitutes a
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E. 1969,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of Texas at
Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (West 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
27.01 (West 2012). The TSFA is embedded in a statute that also covers real estate fraud, so many
of the cases dealing with TSFA’s statutory fraud deal with real estate. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01 (West 2012).
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2010) (Comment to 1977
Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87,
102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities
Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129–30 n.3 (2013) (discussing Highland Capital Mgt.); George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1293–1302 (discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l).
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security or a stock and the persons liable, as well as federal preclusion of state
securities fraud actions, determine the fraudulent transactions subject to the
state’s securities acts. Texas courts have joined the rest of the nation in
concluding that interests in life settlements constitute “investment contracts”
and therefore are securities under the TSA.4 Texas courts also rejected aider and
abettor liability in the absence of proof of a violation of the TSA by the primary
violator.5
A. INTERESTS IN LIFE SETTLEMENTS ARE SECURITIES
The key issue for the Texas Appellate Court in Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc. 6
involved interests in life settlements. A life settlement is a transaction under
which an owner of a life insurance policy sells the policy at a discount (reflecting
a future rate of return and premium costs over the owner’s expected life) in
order to obtain a lump sum to spend. Life Partners is a financial intermediary
that locates policy sellers, negotiates the discount, locates investors to provide
the purchase price of fractional interests in the life insurance policies, 7 takes title
to the policies as agents of the investors, and maintains a trust fund to pay the
premiums. If the insured outlives the life expectancy used to discount the sale
price of the policy, Life Partners requires the investors to contribute additional
amounts to pay premiums needed to continue the policies. 8 Life Partners is
notorious for underestimating the life expectancies used in calculating the
discounts, 9 information Life Partners concealed from the investors. These
miscalculations have the effect of reducing expected rates of return and
increasing the premium costs potentially leading to losses on the investment.
Life Partners concealed those errors by providing investors with only the total
acquisition cost, with no breakdown of the amounts paid by the policy owners,
the escrow amount, Life Partners’ fees, and expenses such as physician fees,
escrow fees, consultant fees, and broker fees. 10
4. See infra note 22 for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) report on life
settlements as securities.
5. See infra Part B.
6. Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 4553379 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2013).
7. See Brief of Appellant, Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 4553379 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Aug. 28, 2013), No. 05-12-000922012 WL 1936145, at *4–6 (investors do not generally invest in a
particular policy, but only provide the amount they desire to invest and the range of life
expectancies they desire), *7–8 (investors generally become owners of fractional interests in several
policies).
8. Id. at *10.
9. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Odds Skew Against Investors In Bets on Strangers’
Lives, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010), at A1 (for investments made in 2002 through 2005, 83% of the
insureds lived past their life expectancies).
10. See Brief for Appellant, Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 4553379 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 28, 2013), No. 05-12-00092 2012 WL 1936145, at *6–7 (acquisition cost includes
amount paid to policy owner, an escrowed amount for paying future premiums, fees paid the policy
owner’s broker, fees paid physicians to determine life expectancy, fees paid escrow agents, fees paid
the investor’s consultant, and fees paid Life Partners for facilitating the purchase). The principal
behind Life Partners, Inc., a subsidiary of Life Partners Holdings, Inc., a public company located in
Waco, Texas, is Brian D. Pardo. See Life Partners Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10Q)(Oct. 15, 2013), at 6, 28 (president and chief executive officer), available under Westlaw’s SEC’s
Edgar filings. The author’s former law firm represented Pardo’s prior public company, American
Solar King Corporation, with respect to securities matters (private placements, registrations under
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In Arnold, the investors of interests in life settlements sued under the TSA for
rescission or damages for failure to register the interests with the Texas State
Securities Board (TSSB)11 and for making an untrue statement of a material fact
by claiming the life settlements were not securities. 12 Life Partners filed a
counterclaim against the investors asserting that the investors’ claims were
groundless, brought for the purposes of harassment. 13 Life Partners then moved
for a summary judgment on the investors’ claims and their counterclaim,
contending that no violation of the TSA occurred because the interests in the
life settlements were not securities as a matter of law, the TSA excludes contracts
of insurance from the definition of security, and the TSA’s statute of limitations
had run on most of the claims. 14 The trial court granted the motion for
the Securities Act, and periodic reports under the Exchange Act). After the author left Waco, the
Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] sanctioned Pardo for filing fraudulent
financial statements for American Solar King Corporation. See Accounting & Auditing
Enforcement Act, SEC Release No. 12762, 48 SEC Docket 64 (Jan. 18, 1991) (consent to
permanent injunction); Complaint Names Ask Corp. & Brian D. Pardo SEC NEWS DIGEST, July 20,
1989, (complaint for materially overstating revenues in 1983, 1984, and 1985); see also Fine v. Am.
Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 293–95 (5th Cir. 1990) (securities fraud claim against corporation,
corporate officers, including Brian D. Pardo, and accounting firm for inflating earnings and
detailing the method of overstatement), cert. denied sub nom. Main Hurdman v. Fine, 502 U.S. 976
(1991); see also Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against ASK Corporation and Brian Pardo, SEC
NEWS DIGEST 91-14, 1991 WL 77075 (for the same offense).
This fraudster did not stop with American Solar King Corporation. See SEC v. Life Partners,
Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537–38 (5th Cir. 1996) (SEC’s first attempt to stop Brian D. Pardo’s scheme of
selling interests in life settlements with unfavorable discounts by focusing on the investors in the
life settlements); SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., Brian D. Pardo, R. Scott Peden and David M.
Martin, SEC NEWS DIGEST 2012-2, 2012 WL 12723 (SEC’s second attempt to stop the life
settlement fraud by focusing on the overvaluation of a public company’s assets and accounting
tricks to create the appearance of steady earnings [Pardo’s second effort to overstate a public
company’s
revenue])
(for
a
copy
of
the
complaint,
see
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014)); see also
Rob Wells, House GOP Candidate Questioned about $3Million FDIC Claim, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/House-GOP-Candidate-Questioned-About-$3Million-FDIC-Claim/id-fc696c06d79a3ec3543fc3e36a9e9b02 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (SEC
lawsuit claiming Brian D. Pardo’s manipulation of the sale of his bank loan for four cents on the
dollar defrauded FDIC; also discusses the other two frauds).
11. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(1) (West 2012) (“A person who offers or
sells a security in violation of Section 7 [requiring registration with the TSSB] . . . is liable to the
person buying the security from him . . . for rescission or for damages if the buyer no longer owns
the security”); Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 4553379 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2013).
The action was brought as a class action, but the trial court did not certify a class. Since the
securities involved are not covered securities, the class action need not be brought in federal court.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) & (c) (2012) (Securities Act: requiring class actions involving covered
securities based on state law alleging an untrue statement or omission to be maintained in federal
court); 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) & 77r(b) (2012) (Securities Act: defining covered securities as listed
on a national exchange).
12. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (West 2012) (“A person who offers or
sells a security . . . by means of an untrue statement of a material fact . . . is liable to the person
buying the security from him . . . for rescission or for damages if the buyer no longer owns the
security.”).
13. Apparently the fashionable thing for the well-heeled when sued for securities fraud is to
file harassment suits against the investors and those that represent them. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban,
No. 3:08-CV-2050-D, 2009 WL 4544178, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2009) (Mark Cuban seeking
legal fees from the SEC, which sued him on behalf of investors for insider trading, for prosecutorial
misconduct in its pre-suit investigation motivated by a bias against him evidenced among other
actions by e-mails sent between SEC officials mocking him and repeated questioning of key
witnesses in the case).
14. Brief of Appellants, Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 455379 (Tex. App.—Dallas
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summary judgment and found the investors’ claims frivolous. The appellate
court affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and reversed and
remanded in part. 15
The TSA’s definition of a “security” includes an “investment contract.” 16 The
United States Supreme Court has construed the term “investment contract”
under the federal securities laws. 17 The Texas Supreme Court has accepted that
construction for the TSA definition since the legislature took that definition
from the federal securities laws. 18 Under the Texas version, the purported
investment contract must satisfy four requirements: (1) an investment of money,
(2) a common enterprise, (3) an expectation of profit, and (4) a profit solely from
the efforts of others. 19 The only real question for interests in life settlements is
the last element. 20
The question of whether Life Partners’ fraudulent scheme constitutes an
investment contract has appeared in the courts before. The earliest case, with a
less-than-spectacular opinion by a less than competent justice of the federal D.C.
Circuit, created a distinction between pre-sale efforts and post-sale efforts,
concluding that only post-sale efforts count towards the “solely from the efforts
of others” element.21 Since the justice viewed those efforts as merely ministerial
(paying premiums, ascertaining the insured location and death), there was no
profit from the effort of others and so no investment contract was involved. 22
Life Partners won a similar case in its hometown of Waco. 23
Since these decisions, however, the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that even investments that have a fixed return satisfy the “solely from the
efforts of others” requirement and constitute securities as investment
contracts.24 There is no reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns
and variable returns, which the pre-sale and post-sale distinction creates.
Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 05-12-00092) 9012 WL 1936145, at *11–12.
15. Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 455379 Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2013).
16. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (West 2012).
17. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (an investment contract “involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.”).
18. See Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639–40 (Tex. 1977).
19. See id.
20. See SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Life Partners,
Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dissenting opinion). For some federal circuits the
common enterprise element might not be satisfied by interests in life settlements. There are two
types of common enterprise, horizontal commonality (multiple investors under a promoter) or
vertical commonality (an investor and a promoter). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits recognize vertical
commonality, while the Seventh Circuit does not. See Zang v. Alliance Fin. Servs. of Ill., Ltd., 2010
WL 3842366, at *5 (N.D. Ill.) (finding interests in life settlements not to be securities for failure to
satisfy the common enterprise element).
21. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (1996).
22. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545–47 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (J. Ginsburg); but see
id., at 552 (dissenting op.: the focus should be on the investors’ dependence on the promoter and
lack of information, which makes the life settlement different from non-securities investments such
as silver bars or paintings).
23. See Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 1178418, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 26,
2004, no pet.) (succumbs to the erroneous post-sale distinction, only significant factor is death of
insured, not efforts of others).
24. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394–97 (2004) (finding sale of phone booths followed
by lease-back to promoters as an investment contract and therefore a security).
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Consequently, the federal Eleventh Circuit has determined that interests in life
settlements are indeed investment contracts under the federal securities laws. 25
Similarly, a number of state courts have determined that interests in life
settlements are investment contracts under their respective securities laws. 26 A
staff report of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2010
indicated that by that time, most states had determined that interests in life
settlements constituted securities. 27 The TSSB has recently determined that
interests in life settlements are investment contracts and are therefore securities
subject to the requirements of the TSA—specifically those regarding registration
of securities and sellers and avoidance of misstatements and omissions. 28
Moreover, the TSSB through the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Life
Partners and its principals in district court in Travis County for violations of the
TSA seeking injunctive relief, the appointment of a receiver over both Life
Partners, Inc. and Life Partners Holdings, Inc., restitution, disgorgement, a
constructive trust, and civil penalties.29 Consequently, the TSSB, through the
25. See SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005) (violation of federal
securities acts); see also Wulliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 124 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (same).
26. Cited by the Arnold court, see Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001);
Joseph v. Viatica, Mgmt., LLC, 55 P.3d 264, 266–68 (Colo. App. 2002); Allen v. Jones, 604 S.E.2d
644, 645–47 (2004); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191, 1196–97 (Ind. App. 2003) (noting that after
the sale Indiana amended its definition of “security” to include life settlements); Michelson v.
Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Mich. App. 2003). Not cited by the Arnold court, see Rumbaugh v.
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 800 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); see also In re Trade Partners,
Inc. Investors Litigation, 2008 WL 3992168, *4–7 (W.D. Mich.) (Okla. law, and declining to
decide Texas law); SEC v. Tyler, 2002 WL 32538418 (N.D. Tx. 2002) (interests in life settlements
securities when promoter promised there would be a liquid after-market maintained by the
promoter).
Georgia and Indiana have adopted the Uniform Securities Act of 2002, while Colorado has
adopted the Uniform Securities Act of 1985. See Unif. Securities Act 2002 Refs & Annos & Unif.
Securities Act 1985 Refs & Annos, both available on Westlaw. The Uniform Securities Act of 2002
defines investment contracts to include life settlements. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(E) (2002).
27. See LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC (July 22, 2010),
available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/lifesettlements-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
The report indicated that by 2010 thirty-five states had amended their securities statutes to include
life settlements in the definition of security (although Ky, Iowa, Me, Neb., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
and Wis. exempt the sale between the policy owner to the promoter), that nine additional states
(Del., La., Md., Mass., N.H., N.Y., Ore., Va., and Wash.) had found life settlements securities
under an investment contract analysis, and that securities regulators in three additional states (Ala.,
Pa, and R.I.) had issued policy statements concluding life settlements as securities under an
investment contract analysis. Id. at 36. Only Connecticut and Wyoming had made no
determinations. Id. Texas was listed as divided with the Waco Appellate Court determining that life
settlements were not securities, citing Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 1178418, *2 (Tex.
App.—Waco May 26, 20014, no pet.) (mem. op.), and the TSSB issuing cease and desist orders
finding life settlements securities, citing In the Matter of Retirement Value, LLC, Bruce Collins
and Richard “Dick” Gray, No. ENF-10-CDO-1686, 2010 WL 1267213, *9 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar.
29, 2010). Id. The staff report recommended an amendment to the federal securities laws to
include life settlements in the definition of securities under the federal securities laws. Id. at 39.
28. See In the Matter of Senior Moments, Robert “Bob” Martins & Virginia Marie Martins,
No. ENF-11-CDO-1698, 2011 WL 359225 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 2, 2011) (without any bond); In
the Matter of AGAP Life Offerings, LLC, Charles D. Madden & Mathew Searle, No. ENF-11CDO-1697, 2011 WL 280998, at *4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 20, 2011) (when coupled with a
maturity bond to offer some protection against a longer than expected life time); In the Matter of
Ret. Value, LLC, Bruce Collins & Richard “Dick” Gray, No. ENF-10-CDO-1686, 2010 WL
1267213, at *9 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 29, 2010) (when secured by a bond).
29. See Brief of Appellants, Texas v. Life Partners Holding, Inc., 2013 WL 1955851 (Tex.
App.—Austin May 5, 2013) (No. 03—13-0019) 2013 WL 3973955, at *viii.
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Texas Attorney General, filed an amicus brief in Arnold to ensure a correct
interpretation of the TSA. 30
The Dallas Appellate Court recognized it was not bound by a decision of the
Waco Appellate Court, much less by an opinion of the federal D.C. Circuit.
The court noted the post-sale dependence by investors on Life Partners to track
the insured’s health status, whereabouts, and death, and for premium
administration and policy benefit collection, and determined that the success of
the entire transaction depended on the pre-sale expertise of Life Partners. So the
court decided that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, based on the pronouncement
of the U.S. Supreme Court to broadly interpret “security” to apply to all
schemes that seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits, 31 and
those of the several state courts were better reasoned. Such is the majority
opinion of most state courts and legislatures.32 Consequently, all the efforts of
Life Partners in structuring the transaction was found to have satisfied the
“solely from the efforts of others” requirement.
The court then quickly dispensed Life Partners’ argument that the TSA
excluded life settlements from the definition of securities as insurance policies. 33
There was no evidence that Life Partners filed anything with the Department of
Insurance with respect to the life settlements as required by the definitional
exclusion for insurance policies. 34 Moreover, the life settlement transaction was
effectively the opposite of an insurance transaction. Life settlements trade
increased future risk for current consumption, while insurance transactions
trade current consumption for reduced future risk.
Having determined that the interests in the life settlements were securities,
the court dealt with the statute of limitations. Failure to register a claim carries a
three year statute of limitations, which begins running at the time of the sale. 35
A “sale by misstatement” claim carries limitations of five years from the sale, and
three years from the time the buyer should have discovered the misstatement. 36
Unfortunately for the investors, they had plead that the interests in the life
30. See Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL
4553379 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2013), 2012 W.L. 384 6289, at *2.
31. See SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 742 (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389,
393–94: Congressional intent with the definition of investment contract was provide flexibility to
adapt to the various schemes fraudsters are likely to conjure).
32. See supra note 22 for the SEC’s report on life settlements as securities.
33. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (West 2012) (“Provided, however, that this
definition [of “security”] shall not apply to any insurance policy, endowment policy, annuity
contract, optional annuity contract, or any contract or agreement in relation to and in consequence
of any such policy or contract, issued by an insurance company subject to the supervision or control
of the Texas Department of Insurance when the form or such policy or contract has been duly filed
with the Department . . .”).
34. Another Texas Appellate Court had similarly determined that selling a life settlement did
not constitute the business of insurance. See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Threlkeld & Co. Ins.
Agency, 152 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied) (interpretation of insurance
contract provision, not a securities law case).
35. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H)(1) (West 2012) (“(1) No person may sue
under Section 33A(1) more than three years after the sale . . .”).
36. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H)(2) (West 2012) (“(2) No person may sue
under Section 33A(2) . . . more than three years after discovery of the untruth or omission, or after
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence; or more than five years
after the sale . . .”).
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settlements were securities when issued under a 1977 Texas Supreme Court
case 37 and therefore the court concluded they should have known at the time of
sale of the misstatement that the interests were not securities. This incredible
conclusion suggests that the district court judge in this case and the several
Waco appellate judges in the Griffitts 38 case were also grossly incompetent for
failing to realize the same and that Life Partners and its lawyers behaved
unethically when they filed their answer, doing so only to drive up the litigation
cost of the investors. 39 Based on the conclusion that the investors should have
known interests in life settlements were securities, the court applied the three
year statute of limitation. The court then affirmed summary judgment for those
investments occurring before the three year period, and reversed and remanded
summary judgment for those investments occurring within the three year period.
With respect to the harassment charges against the investors, since they were
correct on the securities issue, the court vacated the sanction order.
Although the Attorney General, as amicus curiae, obtained a favorable ruling
from the Arnold court, it lost a Travis county district court case against Life
Partners, now on appeal. 40 Thus, there should shortly be another ruling on the
issue of whether interests in life settlements are investment contracts—hopefully
decided correctly—to shut down Life Partners’ fraud once and for all.
Because of this pending appeal from Travis County, the Texas Appellate
Court in Austin will no longer be able to dodge the issue of whether life
settlements are securities by virtue of being investment contracts. In Trinity
Settlement Services, LLC v. Texas State Securities Board, 41 the Austin Appellate
Court did manage to dodge the issue. Trinity Settlement Services, designing to
encounter the life settlement business, challenged the TSSB’s actions, noted in
the SEC staff report, 42 against another life settlement business, Retirement
Value, LLC. 43 Trinity Settlement Services sought a declaratory judgment that
the TSSB’s action against Retirement Value, LLC, was without statutory
authority and a declaratory judgment that interests in life settlements were not
securities under the TSA. The TSSB had issued a cease and desist order against
Retirement Value for selling interests in life settlements worth $100 million to
37. See Searsy v. Commercial Trading Cor., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639–40 (Tex. 1977).
38. See Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 1178418 (Tex. App.—Waco May 26, 2004, no
pet.)
39. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 9.011 & 10.001 (West 2012) (attorney’s signing
pleadings and motions certify that the pleading or motion is not brought for an improper purpose
such as harassment, delay, or to increase litigation costs); TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (attorney’s signing
pleadings and motions certify to the best of the attorney’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry the
instrument is not groundless, in bad faith, or brought to harass, and a court on its own motion can
sanction the lawyer, the represented party, or both). Sanctions, however, require the absence of a
reasonable inquiry, see Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 616 (Tex. 2007), and the existence of cases
on both sides of the issue may preclude such sanctions.
40. See State v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 1955851 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8,
2013, no pet.).
41. 2013 WL 4009158 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 1, 2013, pet. filed).
42. See supra note 22 for the SEC’s report on life settlements as securities.
43. The challenged TSSB actions involved Retirement Value. See In the Matter of Ret. Value,
LLC, Bruce Collins and Richard “Dick” Gray, No. ENF-10-CDO-1686, 2010 WL 1267213, at *9
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 29, 2010). Trinity also used as evidence another such TSSB action. See In
the Matter of AGAP Life Offerings, LLC, Charles D. Madden & Mathew Searle, No. ENF-11CDO-1697, 2011 WL 280998, at *4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 20, 2011).
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800 investors, telling each they would receive 16.5% annual returns on their
investment. 44 Retirement Value’s alleged TSA violations involved sales of
unregistered securities, sales by unregistered agents, securities fraud, and making
materially misleading statements. 45 Because of the TSSB order against
Retirement Value and rather than comply with the TSA, Trinity Settlement
Services had ceased “its own anticipated business operations and refused any
business” from potential customers. The TSSB filed a plea to the jurisdiction.
The trial court granted the plea. The appellate court affirmed. 46 With respect to
the first action challenging the TSSB’s action against Retirement Value, under
the Texas Administrative Procedures Act (TAPA), jurisdiction is conferred to
challenge a rule of the agency, even an ad-hoc rule.47 But the TSSB had limited
its action against Retirement Value to the specific life settlement sold by
Retirement Value, and repeatedly stated in the hearing that the TSSB must
analyze the specific facts of each challenged investment in interests in life
settlements before making a determination as to whether the investment
constituted a security. Consequently, there was no ad-hoc rule and no
jurisdiction under the TAPA. With respect to the action for a declaration that
interests in life settlements are not securities, under the Texas Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act (TUDJA), a party may have a declaration of its rights
under a statute, but only for an actual situation, not a hypothetical or
contingent situation. 48 Since Trinity Settlement Services had yet to structure a
transaction involving interests in life settlements and engage in various selling
practices, there were no facts upon which to determine whether the transaction
was a security. Consequently, the appellate court in Trinity Settlement Services did
not need to reach the key issue of the Arnold court, whether interests in life
settlements are securities.
Arnold puts Texas securities law back in the American mainstream with
respect to interests in life settlements. A finding that interests in life settlements
are securities will end the fraud of Life Partners, but will not stop legitimate sales
of interests in life settlements. It would only require the appropriate registrations
and disclosures required by the TSA, thus exposing the expense structures and
track record for life settlement sellers. Life Partners and other life settlement
companies.

44. See In the Matter of Ret. Value, LLC, 2010 WL 1267213, at *3.
45. See id. at *9.
46. Omitted from this article are the grounds for jurisdiction relating to a declaratory
judgment that the TSSB acted without statutory authority against a non-party (Retirement Value)
and that the TSSB acted ultra viresly.
47. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038 (West 2012) (if an agency rule impairs a legal right or
privilege of the plaintiff); CenterPoint Energy Entex v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 213 S.W.3d 364, 369
(Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. dismissed) (ad hoc rules occur when the agency makes a
determination against the instant party that has implications to others; made for the purpose of
avoiding providing support for a formal rule).
48. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004 (West 2012); Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v.
City of Bulverde, 234 S.W.3d 126, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.).
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B. NO AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRIMARY
VIOLATOR
The ease of becoming judgment proof in Texas, with liberal exemptions from
execution of judgment, makes secondary liability very important. The Texas
statutes provide for several vicarious liability theories, including aiding and
abetting and control person liability. Since federal securities law does not allow a
private investor to recover against aiders and abettors,49 aiding and abetting has
become a significant aspect of state securities law. One Texas appellate opinion
dealt with aiding and abetting when there had been no finding of a primary
violator of the TSA.
Every now and then an appellate court has to deal with a less-than-capable
lawyer. Willis v. Marshall 50 is one such case. In Willis, a promoter controlled two
limited partnerships engaged in medical imaging, one as a 99% limited partner,
the other as 50% owner and president of the general partner. The promoter
obtained permission from two limited partners who desired to sell their interests
to disclose financial information on the limited partnerships to prospective
investor-buyers. The promoter hired an accounting firm to perform accounting
services for the limited partnerships. Shortly, the limited partners, desiring to
sell, sued the promoter for various breaches of fiduciary duty and failure to keep
adequate accounting records. The promoter got the accounting firm to prepare
financial scenarios for the financing and buy-out of the two limited partnerships,
and to prepare two financial statements and compilation reports for several
accounting periods, one set using straight-line depreciation, the other set using
accelerated depreciation. Each statement and compilation report advised the
reader to see the disclaimer letter addressed from the accounting firm to the
partners of the two limited partnerships. The disclaimer letters warned that the
accountants had not audited or reviewed the financial statements comprising
the compilation and explained that the compilation was merely a presentation
of information and representations of the promoter, that the promoter had
elected to omit substantially all the disclosures required by generally accepted
accounting practices, and that inclusion of that omitted information may
influence the reader’s conclusions about the financial condition of the limited
partnerships. 51 After the selling partners sold their interests to the plaintiffs, the
accounting firm continued to prepare the financial statements and compilation
reports for several additional accounting periods, again with the reference to
read the disclaimer letter. The new limited partners brought suit against the
accounting firm for violation of the TSFA and TSA. 52
49. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
175–76 (1994).
50. Willis v. Marshall, 401 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).
51. See id.
52. The investors also sued additionally for harm done to the limited partnerships after their
entry, and before their entry as is typical with many fraud cases, for negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, fraudulent inducement, and conspiracy. These issues are not discussed in this article
other than as follows concerning the capability of the investors’ attorney. The accounting firm had
filed a denial that in part the plaintiffs could not recover in the capacity they sued. See Appellee’s
Brief, Willis v. Marshall, 401 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.), 2011 WL 7164393, at
*1. For the harm done after the investors’ entry was in the nature of a derivative action. See TEX.
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The appellate court quickly dismissed the TSFA claim stating the investors’
lawyer cited no authority challenging the trial court’s conclusion. The real
problem is that the TSFA applies to “a transaction in valuing real estate or stock
in a corporation or joint stock company.” 53 Since limited partnerships own
personalty but not stock, TSFA does not apply. 54 Similarly, a partner in a
medical imaging limited partnership would not be considered to own stock in
the partnership.
The investors’ aider and abettor claim under the TSA fared no better. Again
the appellate court expressed frustration concerning the absence of authority in
the documents submitted by the investors’ attorney (no citation to any provision
of the TSA violated or applicability of those provisions to the acts of the
accounting firm). 55 Under the TSA provision for aider and abettor liability, 56
the Texas appellate courts have determined four elements of the cause of action:
(1) a primary violator; (2) general awareness by the aider; (3) substantial
assistance by the aider; and (4) the aider intended to deceive or acted with
reckless disregard for the truth. 57 The claim for aiding and abetting requires a
primary violator of the TSA. In explaining the scienter requirement for aiders
and abettors, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the TSA differed from the
Uniform Securities Act provision used in other states by expanding the possible
aiders and abettors but requiring a more difficult scienter. 58 With respect to the
suggestion that a primary violator could escape liability because of an affirmative
defense (such as buyer knowledge of the misstatement or the seller in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the investment), 59 while an
aider and abettor had no affirmative defenses, the Texas Supreme Court noted
that the aider and abettor did have a defense, namely the defense that the
primary violator was not liable since the statute only provides for aider and
BUS. ORG. CODE §§ 153.401 (West 2012) (limited partners may bring suit in the name of the
limited partnership for harm done the limited partnership) & 153.403 (required effort to get the
general partner to bring the action or explain reasons for not so doing). Consequently, the
appellate court quickly dispatched these claims, citing an appellate court decision involving a
similarly situated limited partnership. See Naustar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 250–51
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
53. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a) (West 2012).
54. See Kitchell v. Aspen Exploration, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 843, 856 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (oil and
gas); Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384, 1392 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (real estate
development). For recent Texas cases dealing with whether LLC interests are “stock” under the
TSFA, see Flint, Securities Regulation, 66, supra note 3, at 104–07 (discussing Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C.
v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2010)).
55. See Willis, 401 S.W.3d 689.
56. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (West 2012) (“A person who directly or
indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law
materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable under Section 33A, 33B or 33C jointly
and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer,
or issuer.”).
57. See Navarro v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 316 S.W.3d 715, 720–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied ); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 64 SMU L. REV. 535,
543–46 (2011) (discussing Navarro).
58. See Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex. 2005); see also George Lee
flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 59 SMU L. REV. 1541, 1549–53 (2006) (discussing Sterling Trust).
59. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (West 2012) (defense for a misstatement
or omission violation).
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abettor liability to the same extent as if he were “the primary violator.” 60 Thus,
the investors in Willis needed to prove the promoter had violated the TSA. They
had not joined the promoter to the action nor provided any evidence that the
promoter had been found as a primary violator of the TSA. 61
Willis shows the importance of background checks by service providers,
including lawyers, when representing disreputable clients in business deals.
Another partner in the ill-fortuned business indicated that before entering the
deal in 2004 he should have checked the court records for the fraudster, which
would have revealed a number of disgruntled former partners and creditors,
including the former chief executive officer of Dr. Pepper. 62 When the Willis
fraudster declared bankruptcy, 63 the accounting firm was sued as an aider and
abettor. Those fraudsters desirous of escaping through bankruptcy should
remember there is a homestead exemption cap of $155,675 for violators of the
securities laws. 64
II. SECURITIES FRAUD DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, in interpreting the TSA’s similar language, Texas courts look to
federal decisions under the federal statutes. 65 As a result, there is an interest in
Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions. Fraud actions under the federal
statutes generally possess six elements: (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with a purchase or sale of a security, (4)
reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) “loss causation,” that is, a causal connection
between the material misrepresentation and the loss. 66 The last element comes
from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 67 The Fifth Circuit
dealt with situations involving the reliance requirement and the scienter

60. See Sterling Trust, 168 S.W.3d at 845.
61. Instead, they relied on presenting some evidence that might have led to a finding of a
primary violation had the promoter been joined to the lawsuit and allowed to defend himself. See
Brief of Appellant, Willis v. Marshall, 401 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.), 2011
WL 4501165, *41 (promoter sold the securities by means of untrue statements and omissions of
material facts).
62. See Checking for Checkered Pasts: Businessman Says Deeper Look into Partner Could Have Saved
Him Millions, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 18, 2007) (delineating a string of lawsuits against the
Willis fraudster by former partners and creditors before this partner entered the ill-fortuned
business with the fraudster, including one by the former chief executive officer of Dr. Pepper, and a
bankruptcy in Feb. 2007), available at http://cable.tmcnet.com/news/2007/04/18/2530608.htm
(lasted visited Nov. 23, 2014).
63. See id.
64. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(q) (2012); see also In re Bounds, 491 B.R. 440, 444–50 (W.D. Tex.
2013) (permitting the bankruptcy trustee to sell the $500,000 homestead house and return to the
debtor $136,875, the then limit, to help satisfy Fernea’s $2,289,349 judgment against debtor of
violating the TSA and TSFA); Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2011 WL
2769838 (Tex. App.—Austin, no pet.), appeal abated, 2011 WL 4424291 (Tex. App.—Austin, no
pet.) (Fernea’s lawsuit against the bankrupt Bound’s former employer for aiding and abetting);
Flint, Securities Regulation, 66, supra note 3, at 118–22 (discussing Fernea).
65. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
66. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2013)).
67. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
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requirement.68 The burning issue for the Fifth Circuit, after the Supreme
Court’s reversal of one of its cases, 69 concerned whether an issuer can challenge
“loss causation” to rebut the fraud-on-the-market theory’s rebuttable
presumption of reliance at the class certification stage. The Fifth Circuit has also
dealt with whether accounting irregularities made by an executive officer
establish a strong inference of scienter.
A. PRICE IMPACT NOT ADMISSIBLE AT CLASS CERTIFICATION TO REBUT THE
RELIANCE PRESUMPTION
Congress passed the PSLRA 70 to discourage extortive securities litigation,
such as filing class action lawsuits for securities fraud whenever a significant
change in the issuer’s price occurred, and abusing the discovery process to
impose such burdensome costs on the issuer so as to make it more economical
for the victimized issuer to settle (thereby harming its current shareholders).71
To lessen the extortive impact of class certification and to bring the implied
cause of action under Rule 10b-5 72 more in line with its purpose to protect
investors, 73 the Fifth Circuit had imposed a requirement for class certification of
finding “loss causation” before allowing substitution of fraud-on-the-market
theory’s rebuttable presumption for the reliance element in a cause of action. 74
To invoke the rebuttable presumption under that requirement, investors must
establish (1) the perpetrator made public misrepresentations, (2) the
misrepresentations were material, (3) the securities traded in an efficient market,
and (4) the investor traded between the misstatement and the revealing of the
truth.75
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, ruling that
proof of “loss causation” is not required to obtain benefit of the presumption of
reliance. 76 But the Supreme Court left open the issue of whether the issuer
could use “price impact” to rebut the presumption at the class certification
stage. 77 After a cursory remand to the district court 78 and the district court’s
68. See, e.g., Abrams v. Bauer Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 431 (2002).
69. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Haliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), rev’g Archdiocese
of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Haliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
71. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2012) (authorizing SEC fraud rule making only for “the public
interest or for the protection of investors”).
74. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir.
2007); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1128–29 (2008)
(discussing Oscar Private Equity Invs.).
75. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988); see also Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192–93 (2013).
76. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), rev’g Archdiocese
of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010); see also
Flint, Securities Regulation, 66, supra note 3, at 143–49 (discussing Erica P. John Fund); Flint, Securities
Regulation, 64, supra note 56, at 550–53 (discussing Archdiocese of Milwaukee).
77. See Erica P. John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (to the extent the issuer preserved any further
arguments against class certification).
78. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 647 F.3d 533,
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certification of the class, 79 the issue of rebutting the presumption at the class
certification stage came back before the Fifth Circuit in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co. (II). 80 Since the circuit courts were split on the issue of rebutting
materiality, 81 the Supreme Court opined on the subject before the Fifth Circuit
could act. 82 The Supreme Court considered whether the issuer could use
evidence the market already knew the truth because of analysts’ reports and
public documents to rebut the materiality element of the rebuttable
presumption at class certification and determined it could not. 83 The Supreme
Court indicated that evidence rebutting the other elements might be admissible
at the class certification stage. 84 For this determination the Supreme Court set
forth a two-pronged test: (1) is the rebuttable element an objective inquiry
proved through evidence common to the class and (2) is there no risk that
failure to prove the rebutted element will result in individual questions
predominating? 85 An affirmative answer to both prongs would exclude the
evidence of the element at the class certification stage.
An ensuing Fifth Circuit case involved whether the issuer could use “price
impact,” to rebut not one of the specific other elements of the rebuttable
presumption but the presumption in toto. 86 Using the Supreme Court’s test, the
Fifth Circuit determined that “price impact” would be established by expert
evaluation of the stock market price following a specific event (objective
evidence) and would apply to everyone in the class, answering the first prong in
the positive. 87 With respect to the second prong, the issuer claimed that failure
to prove the various elements of the rebuttable presumption would leave each
member of the class with viable fraud actions based on their own reliance rather

584 (5th Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court and remanding).
79. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2012 W.L.
565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (also denying the issuer any ability to supplement the record as untimely,
despite using an incorrect principle when making that record).
80. See 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
81. Compare In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation, 544 F.3d 474, 484 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“allowed to rebut the presumption prior to class certification, by showing, for example, the absence
of a price impact”) and In re DVI, Inc. Securities Litigation, 639 F.3d 623, 638 (3rd Cir. 2011) (“we
believe rebuttal of the presumption of reliance falls within the ambit of issues that, if relevant,
should be addressed by district courts at the class certification stage), with Schleicher v. Wendt, 618
F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Defendants say that, before certifying a class, a court must
determine whether false statements materially affected the price. But whether statements were false,
or whether the effects were large enough to be called material, are questions on the merits.”) and
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir.
2011) (“we hold that plaintiffs need not prove materiality to avail themselves of the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance at the class certification stage.”) (emphasis in original), aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1184 (2013) (abrogating Salomon Analyst Metromedia and DVI).
82. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–99 (2013).
83. See id. at 1203–04; see also Brief for Petitioners, Amgen, 2012 WL 3277030, at *5–6
(describing the rebuttal evidence).
84. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1199 (specifically mentioning market efficiency and statement
publicity).
85. See id. at 1195–96 (using materiality as the subject of the evidence).
86. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (“Any showing that severs the link
between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff . . .
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance”).
87. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (II), 718 F.3d 423, 433 (5th Cir. 2013).
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than the class presumption. 88 The Fifth Circuit disagreed. 89 The failure to prove
“price impact” also relates to the “loss causation” element of the fraud action, so
each member of the class, although showing individual reliance, could not
prevail on the fraud action. 90 Consequently, the failure to prove “price impact”
would not lead to individual claim dominance but a dismissal of all, and so the
second prong was also answered in the positive. The proffered “price impact”
evidence was thus excluded at the class certification stage. 91
It is ironic to allow investors claiming to rely on market price to rely on a
misrepresentation that did not affect that market price. The Fifth Circuit’s
problem was how to handle an evidentiary item, “price impact,” that could serve
as evidence for several of the precondition items for the rebuttable presumption,
such as market efficiency and materiality, and also serve as evidence of several of
the elements of the fraud, such as materiality again and loss causation. 92 How
efficient is a market that does not move upon the disclosure of the truth? 93 The
United States Supreme Court had indicated only that those precondition
elements that are simultaneously elements of the cause of action are ruled out—
the remainder must be proved at class certification. 94 The Fifth Circuit,
however, could never divorce “price impact” from the “loss causation” 95
foreclosed at the class certification stage by the United States Supreme Court. 96
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit found for class certification, causing a
divergence from its sister Circuit Courts 97 and prompting another appeal of the
case. 98 Several amici curiae support the appeal, seeking abolition of the
rebuttable presumption that has become no longer rebuttable and to replace it
with a remedy resembling the only other aftermarket securities law remedy for
88. Id. at 434.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. The Fifth Circuit opinion has a second part tacked on at the end as a slap at the winning
investors who obtained the Supreme Court’s reversal. The investors’ claimed that the issuer waived
the “price impact” evidence by not preserving it in the lower court. The United States Supreme
Court’s opinion only saved the issuer’s rebuttal arguments to the extent they had been preserved.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this position since the issuer complied with the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the law at the time. The court refused to apply subsequent changes in the law ex
post facto. See id. at 435–36.
92. See id. at 434–55.
93. See In re DVI, Inc. Securities Litigation, 639 F.3d 623, 634 (3rd Cir. 2011) (“security price
is normally the most important factor in a [market] efficiency analysis”).
94. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 135 S. Ct. 1184, 1199 (2013), 133
S. Ct. at 1199 (must prove market efficiency and public nature of the alleged misrepresentation
before the class can be certified; materiality in contrast also establishes the merits; so failure to
prove market efficiency or public nature leaves open individual proof of reliance, while failure to
prove materiality ends the case for the whole class).
95. See Erica P. John Fund (II), 718 F.3d at 434 (if issuer were successful on proving “price
change” in rebuttal, no investor could prove “loss causation”).
96. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (price
impact is not loss causation, which is not required to be proved at class certification).
97. See DVI, Inc., 639 F.3d at 634 (price impact admissible at class certification to rebut market
efficiency); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation, 544 F.3d 474, 483–84 (price impact
admissible at class certification in toto to sever the causation link of the presumption); see also
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (price impact not admissible to rebut materiality).
98. See Pet’r’s Pet. for Cert., Erica P. John Fund (II), 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), 2013 WL
4855972 (Sept. 9, 2013).
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fraud—fraud in documents filed with the SEC, which statutorily requires a
showing of individual reliance. 99 State courts generally have not adopted the
presumption. 100
B. ROGUE OFFICER’S DISREGARD OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES DOES NOT
ESTABLISH A STRONG INFERENCE OF SCIENTER
The PSLRA also requires that investors’ petition recite facts giving a strong
inference of scienter. 101 In the Fifth Circuit, scienter requires an intent to
defraud or either severe recklessness while knowing of the danger to investors or
action despite danger so obvious the officer must have been aware of the
danger. 102 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group pleading doctrine,
so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer, it may not be implied from
prospectuses, registration statements, and press releases. 103
In Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corporation 104 the Fifth
Circuit faced overbearing class action investors, for which Congress designed the
PSLRA, trying to recoup some of their 2008 stock crash losses by demanding
money from Zale Corporation, which had the misfortune of discovering and
revealing, as required by the securities laws, 105 an accounting irregularity in
September 2009 involving over $40 million. 106 The revelation triggered an SEC
investigation, 107 and this fraud class action lawsuit.108
99. See Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Erica P. John Fund (II), 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), 2013 WL
5652547, *9–19 (investors should have to prove actual reliance as in section 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; where “in reliance upon” the falsity must be shown, these cases are the most
analogous statutory action) and *19–22 (overrule the presumption since it is effectively
irrebuttable); see also Brief for Chamber of Commerce For the United States of America &
National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae, Erica P. John Fund (II), 718 F.3d 423 (5th
Cir. 2013), 2013 WL 5652546, *20–24 (to resolve circuit split); Brief for DRI-The Voice of the
Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Erica P. John Fund (II), 718 F.3d 423 (5th
Cir. 2013), 2013 WL 5652548.
100. See Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1198 (N.J. 2000).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012) (“the complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).
102. See Southland v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1155–56 (2005) (discussing
Southland).
103. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
104. Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corporation, 499 Fed. App’x 345
(5th Cir. 2012).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308, item 4.02 (non-reliance on previously issued financial
statements).
106. See Zale Corporation, Form 8-K (Sept. 18, 2009), at 1–2, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/109156/000110465909055266/0001104659-09055266.txt (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (issuer to restate 2007 and 2008 financial statement and
2009 interim financial statements to reflect significant portions of prepaid advertising costs that
should have been expensed totaling $23 million in 2008 and $18 million in 2007). Zale
Corporation stock generally was priced around $30, rose to $43 before the 2008 crash, dropped to
$1 and recovered to about $8 at the time of the adverse disclosure. See www.stockcharts.com for
historical stock price information (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
107. See Zale Corporation, Form 10-K (Oct. 29, 2009), at 13, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/109156/000104746912009281/a2211136z10-k.htm
(Fort Worth office of the SEC investigating the accounting changes described in the filed Form 8K).
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There is not much of an incentive to correct erroneous financial statements
when such action triggers an extortive class action lawsuit. Through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SO), Congress amended the securities laws to
require the SEC to make rules for real time disclosure on a rapid and current
basis of material changes in financial condition or operations. 109 In response to
the Congressional directive, the SEC made revisions to its Form 8-K, the form
the SEC specified for reporting these material financial changes, to add
numerous triggering events mandating public disclosure.110 The revised Form 8K lists as triggering events, among others, creation of a material direct financial
obligation, events that accelerate or increase direct financial obligations, material
charges for impairment to the corporation’s assets (if determined by certain
specified directors and officers), and non-reliance on previously issued financial
statements due to an error in such financial statements (if determined by certain
specified directors and officers). 111 The Form 8-K must be filed within four
business days of the triggering event. 112 Fortunately, envious and greedy class
action investors must plead a strong inference of scienter, which should be
absent in the simple mistake situation.113
The crux of the matter for Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan
involved a Vice President of marketing, who caused the issuer between 2004 and
2009 to record certain television advertising costs as prepaid advertising (an
asset) when those costs should have been expensed in the periods in which they
occurred (reducing income) contrary to the issuer’s policy and generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). 114 The SEC’s action against the (by that time)
former vice president resulted in a $25,000 civil fine, not for fraud, but for
failure to make and keep records fairly reflecting the transactions and for failure
to maintain accounting controls to permit preparation of financial statements in
accordance with management’s policies and GAAP. 115
108. See Rains v. Zale Corp., 2011 WL 3331213, at *1 (N.D. Tex.), aff’d sub nom., Pipefitters
Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corporation, 499 Fed. App’x 345 (5th Cir. 2012).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(l) (2006) (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, § 409: requiring public
companies to disclose to the public rapidly and currently, as the SEC determines by rule).
110. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Rel. 8400, 2004 W.L. 536851, *1.
111. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308, items 2.03(creation of financial obligations), 2.04 (acceleration or
increase in financial obligation), 2.06 (material impairments), & 4.02 (2013) (non-reliance on
previously issued financial statements).
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308, Instruction B1 (2013).
113. See Rains, 2011 WL 3331213, *4 (N.D. Tex.) (determing whether the scienter of Higgins,
an executive in the marketing department, was strong enough to meet the pleading standards, and
whether Higgins’s scienter could be imputed onto Zale and the liability of the individual
defendant). Higgins was not an executive officer; someone else served as Executive Vice President,
Marketing and E-Commerce. See Zale Corporation, Form 10-K (Oct. 29, 2009), supra note 92, at 31
(Richard Lennox, Executive Vice President, Chief of Marketing and E-Commerce since August
2009); Zale Corporation, Form 10-K (Sept. 26, 2008), at 12, available at
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/109156/000104746908010329/a2187916z10-k.htm
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2014) (Steven Larkin, Executive Vice President, Marketing and E-Commerce since
2006).
114. Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corp., 499 Fed. App’x 345, 347–48
(4th Cir. 2012).
115. See SEC v. Rebecca Lynn Higgins, Civ. Act. No. 3:11-CV-763 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2011)
(violations of Exchange Act §§ 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) & 13(b)(2)(B)) (for a copy of the complaint, see
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21930.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014)); see also 17
U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), & 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012) (Exchange Act § 13).
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The complaint in the fraud lawsuit directed at the issuer and several of its
chief officers needed to allege facts indicating a strong inference of scienter. The
only facts offered by the investors dealt with two items: public pronouncements
during the class period of a focus on expense reduction and commitment to
financial rigor and SO certifications that the financial reports were accurate. For
the investors, this meant the officers were paying close attention to expenses and
must have noticed the vice president’s misreporting and ignored it. The Fifth
Circuit found that the public pronouncements and SO certifications in no way
indicated the officers knew the information was inaccurate or ignored evidence
of its falsity.116 Secondly, the investors argued that the scienter of the vice
president should be imputed to the other officers. The Fifth Circuit, noting that
the vice president was a non-accountant, unlikely to know the implications of
her efforts to make her division look good, refused to consider as “seriously
reckless” the reliance of the chief officers on the vice president to provide
accurate information and follow the issuer’s accounting policies. 117 Thirdly, to
the investors, the after-the-fact corrective disclosures constituted admissions. The
Fifth Circuit pointed out that the corrective disclosures in no way relate to the
officers’ scienter at the time of the preparation of the misleading financial
statements.118
In Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan, the Fifth Circuit fortuitously
stopped the investors’ from fouling up the SO mandated rapid disclosure system
for accounting errors. 119 But before anyone concludes the Fifth Circuit favors
rapid disclosure to the investing public concerning false accounting, that person
should examine Kopp v. Klein. 120 That opinion involves an eligible individual
account plan (EIAP) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). 121 EIAPs permit plan participants of public employers to invest
their retirement moneys in their employer’s stock.122 A problem arises when the
employer’s stock will decline if management corrects the false financial
statements. The issue is when the plan trustees, as a part of management, must
urge those responsible to make the disclosure while continuing to allow plan
participants to direct the trustees to purchase and sell company stock. The Fifth
Circuit continues to follow the pre-SO Moench rule 123 and its misinterpretation
116. Pipefitters Local No. 636, 499 Fed. App’x at 350.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Kopp v. Klein, 722 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2013).
121. See id. at 331; see also Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (ERISA codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
122. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(d)(3) (defining EIAP as a type of individual account plan that has a
provision for the acquisition and holding of employer securities) & 1107(d)(6) (2006) (defining
ESOP as designed to invest “primarily” in employer securities); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)
(2006) (defining an individual account plan as a pension plan) & 1002(2) (defining pension plan as
providing retirement benefits or deferral of income until termination of service or beyond).
123. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995) (creating a rebuttable
presumption that plan administrators acted properly), cert. den. 516 U.S. 1115 (1996), adopted in,
Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, 526 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2008) (J. Jones: EIAP with option to
invest in employer stock). The author served with Edith Jones on the Texas Law Review in 1974–
75. As with the fraud-on-the-market rebuttable presumption, the Moench presumption is virtually
irrebuttable. See Kopp, 722 F.3d at 341 (mentioning the horrific stock drops that have failed to
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of ERISA, in conflict with post-SO securities law, 124 permitting abstention of
trading, but neglecting the alternative of disclosure.125 The Fifth Circuit
specifically rejected the disclosure option for the Kopp participants, because it
would cause the stock price to drop.126 But post-SO securities law fosters the
Congressional desire for disclosure by the issuance of the corrective financial
statements for the investing public. One of the items slated for rapid disclosure
is the Fifth Circuit’s approved suspension of trading in EIAPs of employers with
faulty financial statements. 127 Once the disclosure occurs further damage to
investors, including plan participants, will cease. In its eagerness to protect
insider trading, the Fifth Circuit refused to consider whether the EIAP trustees’
actions constituted securities law violations. 128 That, of course, is the key issue in
the case. 129 Whatever ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence 130 means, certainly it
includes obeying the law, including securities law, as do all prudent persons.
III. CONCLUSION
The securities law opinions under Texas law during this Survey periods can be
divided into two groups. The first grouping deals with the scope of the TSA.
Two Texas appellate courts dealt with interests in life settlements, one dodging
the issue as not involving an actual controversy under the TUDJA, 131 the other,
rebut the presumption).
124. See George Lee Flint, Jr., The Moench Presumption: Butchering ERISA, 59 WAYNE L. REV.
461 (2013) (explaining how following Moench misconstrues the post-SO securities law and ERISA,
both mandating rapid disclosure to the public).
125. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); In the Matter of
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (insider failure to disclose material nonpublic information
when trading constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions; if disclosure unrealistic, the
alternative is to forego the transaction). The Supreme Court has recognized this duty on the part of
insiders to abstain or disclose. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 661 (1997) (“duty to
disclose or abstain from trading ‘arises from a specific relationship between two parties’”).
126. See Kopp, 722 F.3d at 339–40.
127. The disclosure operates as follows. Under ERISA, the plan administrator must provide
notice to (1) the employees (see 29 U.S.C. § 1021(i)(2)(B) (2006) (notice to participants)); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2520.101-3(b)(same), (2) the employer (see 29 U.S.C. § 1021(i)(2)(E) (2006) (notice to issuer)); 29
C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(c)(same); and (3) the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(6) (2006) (timely notice to
SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 243.104(b)(2) (2006) (timely within five days of receiving ERISA notice). Upon
the employer’s receipt of the notice, the employer must file a Form 8-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308,
item 5.04 (2013) (blackout periods for self-directed EIAPs). The Kopp fraudsters evaded this
mandated disclosure by making their “suspension” permanent. See Kopp, 722 F.3d at 332; Edgar
filings for Idearc, Inc. (no Form 8-K relating to the suspension under the post-bankruptcy name
Supermedia, Inc.), available under Westlaw’s SEC’s Edgar filings. The Department of Labor’s
“blackout” rules apply only to temporary suspensions, not permanent ones. See Final Rule Relating
to Notice of Blackout Periods to Participants and Beneficiaries; Civil Penalties and Conforming
Technical Changes on Civil Penalties Under ERISA; Final Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 16,3721, 16,3722
(Jan. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2520 et al.) (blackout periods do not include
permanent elimination such as a permanent restriction on new contributions to an investment
option, replacement of one investment option with another of a similar type, or termination of the
plan since these restrictions are not temporary (as required by the statute) unless some right is
temporarily suspended, such as when replacing option A with option B, there is a restriction on
option B while transferring funds from option A to option B).
128. See Kopp, 722 F.3d at 340 n.8.
129. See id. at 333 (whether the actions breach ERISA’s fiduciary duties).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (B)(2006) (fiduciary duties include the duty of prudence).
131. See Trinity Settlement Services, LLC v. Texas State Securities Board, 2013 WL 4009158, at
*10 (Tex. App.—Austin).
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joining the American trend in finding these investments securities since they are
investment contracts.132 The TSSB had previously so determined, and has an
adverse decision on appeal to the same appellate court that earlier dodged the
issue. With respect to aiding and abetting, another Texas appellate court
determined that a service provider compiling accounting information for a
fraudster does not incur liability for aiding and abetting when the investor fails
to provide evidence or obtain a finding that the fraudster committed a violation
of the TSA. 133
The Fifth Circuit had two securities fraud class action cases of note. In the
first, the Fifth Circuit continued to wrestle with the application of pricing
evidence at the class certification stage. 134 Having imposed a “loss causation”
requirement at the class certification stage before, and having had the United
States Supreme Court overrule any such requirement, the Fifth Circuit
attempted to apply the Supreme Court’s new test, devised for another circuit’s
misuse of pricing information to disprove materiality, and found pricing
evidence inadmissible at the class certification stage. This has prompted another
appeal since it differs from the procedure of two other circuit courts. 135 In the
second case, the Fifth Circuit protected an issuer issuing corrective financial
statements in accordance with SO after a series of misstatements were caused by
a rogue employee, who provided management with inaccurate accounting
records contrary to company policies in an attempt to bolster her division’s
performance.136 The investors did not plead a substantial inference of scienter.
Pre-correction strict accounting pronouncements did not mean management
knew of the employee’s accounting inaccuracies; the employee’s scienter would
not be imputed to management since they had a right to believe underlings
would follow the issuer’s policies and GAAP; and the corrective statements did
not amount to admissions that management earlier knew of the accounting
misstatements. 137

132. See Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 4553379 (Tex. App.—Dallas).
133. See Willis v. Marshall, 401 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).
134. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (II), 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
135. See id.
136. See Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corporation, 499 Fed. App’x
345, 351 (5th Cir. 2012).
137. See id. at 350.

